Isolation
The note path is local
Speech recognition and fact extraction run on CPU in the same environment as the application. No clinical text or audio is sent to a third-party language model to produce a note.
Security and known limitations
Most security pages describe aspirations. This one separates verified controls from absent ones, because a clinician or institution evaluating this work needs to know which is which before asking a harder question.
No independent audit · no certification · no public inference endpoint
Verified controls
Isolation
Speech recognition and fact extraction run on CPU in the same environment as the application. No clinical text or audio is sent to a third-party language model to produce a note.
Authority
Draft → reviewed → approved is enforced by the server. Export is refused unless the note is approved. Handlers are not bypassable by disabling browser controls.
Retention
24 hours after approval, 168 hours if never reviewed, swept on a 900-second cycle. Audio is never served from a static path.
This website
Self-hosted fonts, no third-party scripts, no cookies, no analytics, no accounts and no server-side form handling. Content is generated from reviewed source files.
Not implemented
None of the following exists today. If a vendor deck in this category does not publish a list like this, ask them for it.
| Control | Status | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Independent penetration test | None | No third party has attempted to break the system. |
| SOC 2 / ISO 27001 | None | No certification of any kind. Do not assume one. |
| Independent security audit | None | All security claims here are self-assessed. |
| Audio de-identification | None | Retention is time-bounded; content is not filtered. |
| Robust PHI detection | Heuristic | Pattern matching misses Indian phone formats, Aadhaar numbers and Malayalam-script names. |
| Distributed rate limiting | In-memory | Counters are per-process and reset on restart; not suitable for a public endpoint. |
| Encryption at rest, verified | Platform-dependent | Depends on the host; no application-level encryption of stored notes. |
| Incident response plan | None | No documented breach process, no on-call rotation. |
Why publish this The PHI-detection gap is the single strongest argument against exposing a public free-text clinical endpoint, and it is a decision we have made rather than a control we have bought.
Architecture
If you are evaluating for an institution
Ask us for the retention rules, the approval-gate behaviour and the defect register, and test them rather than reading them. We would rather be audited than trusted, and we have not been audited yet.
Reporting a vulnerability
Email hello@clinoria.in with enough detail to reproduce the issue. We will acknowledge it, tell you what we intend to do, and credit you if you want to be credited.
Threat model, briefly
Primary
The dominant risk is not intrusion — it is a clinician approving a fluent, unsupported sentence. Validation and provenance exist for this, and they are imperfect (see defect R3).
Secondary
Addressed by bounded retention and a sweep, not by content filtering. There is no de-identification step to rely on.
Tertiary
Credentialed access to the prototype, no public inference surface, and no engine route reachable from this website.
Audit us
A demonstration can walk the approval gate, the retention sweep and the defect register with you.